The ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Maritime Cooperation, adopted on the forty eighth Summit in Cebu on Might 8, 2026, referred to the 1982 United Nations Conference on the Regulation of the Sea (UNCLOS) no fewer than 18 occasions, reaffirming the important thing ideas of peace and stability, the peaceable settlement of disputes and compliance with UNCLOS.
But ASEAN has by no means formally acknowledged the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award issued by an arbitral tribunal constituted underneath Annex VII of UNCLOS – the very conference that ASEAN itself has repeatedly affirmed as the excellent authorized framework governing all actions at sea.
July 2026 marks the tenth anniversary of the arbitral ruling in favor of the Philippines in its case towards China in regards to the South China Sea. How will ASEAN reply to this essential authorized milestone?
ASEAN’s Historic Response to the 2016 Award
Instantly after the 2016 South China Sea award, ASEAN didn’t forge a unified stance. On the forty ninth ASEAN International Ministers’ Assembly (AMM) held in Vientiane, simply two weeks after the judgment, member states couldn’t attain a consensus to incorporate any direct reference to the ruling within the joint communiqué. In keeping with Philippine officers, each proposed reference was vetoed by a member state with out clarification or counter-proposal. The identical sample reappeared on the thirtieth ASEAN Summit in Manila in 2017 and in subsequent years. Practically a decade on, ASEAN continues to be struggling to succeed in any consensus relating to the 2016 award.
Any makes an attempt to foretell ASEAN’s response require an examination of how its member states have engaged with the award over the previous decade. Given ASEAN’s consensus-based precept, the collective displays the nationwide curiosity and coverage preferences of particular person members.
The sharp divergence amongst ASEAN member states can broadly be categorized into three teams. The primary consists of nations which have overtly aligned themselves with China’s place, specifically Cambodia and Laos, and to a lesser extent Thailand. Cambodia overtly opposed the ruling and vowed to oppose any ASEAN assertion endorsing it. As ASEAN chair in 2016, Laos maintained formal neutrality in an effort to fulfill its tasks, but remained supportive of Beijing’s rejection. Thailand issued a press release on July 12, 2016, that meticulously prevented the phrases “ruling,” “award,” or “tribunal.” Many observers grouped Thailand alongside Laos and Cambodia, arguing that it displayed a bent to tilt towards Beijing in pursuit of protection procurement offers and infrastructure investments.
The second group supported or invoked the award to various levels, together with Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and later the Philippines. Vietnam adopted essentially the most constructive stance inside ASEAN, formally “welcoming” the award, and frequently drawn upon the tribunal’s authorized findings to defend its personal maritime rights and sovereignty claims within the South China Sea.
Indonesia initially responded by calling for restraint and respect for worldwide legislation. Nonetheless, in Might 2020, Jakarta submitted a Word Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-Basic that successfully accepted the award’s conclusion displaying that the “nine-dash line” has no authorized foundation.
Malaysia, sustaining its coverage of “quiet diplomacy,” prevented direct confrontation with Beijing whereas reportedly counting on parts of the award’s authorized reasoning in its 2019 submission to the Fee on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) relating to an prolonged continental shelf declare.
The Philippines has adopted a extra shifting course. Below President Rodrigo Duterte, who took workplace simply weeks earlier than the ruling got here down, Manila adopted a notably restrained response and actively downplayed the award whereas pursuing nearer financial ties with China. This method modified markedly underneath President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who elevated the 2016 award right into a central pillar of the Philippines’ South China Sea technique.
The third is the impartial or silent group, consisting of Brunei, Singapore, and Timor-Leste. Brunei continued to play the function of a “silent” claimant within the South China Sea, avoiding direct confrontation and refraining from issuing any official assertion on the award. Singapore said that it had “taken notice” of the award and was finding out its implications. Nonetheless, throughout a go to to Washington in 2016, then-Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reportedly pressured the significance of respecting the arbitration consequence, drawing criticism from Beijing. Equally, Timor-Leste, which was not but an ASEAN member at the moment, additionally prevented taking a direct stance on the award however insisted UNCLOS as “Structure of the Oceans.”
ASEAN’s consensus mechanism enabled opponents of the award to dam supportive language whereas the supporters keep away from public confrontation. Even when there’s energetic help from Vietnam or the Philippines, it’s inadequate to beat opposition and silence from different members. This structural actuality explains why, regardless of quite a few ASEAN International Ministers’ Assembly and Summits over the previous decade, the group has by no means issued a collective assertion formally recognizing or straight invoking the 2016 award.
Will ASEAN Change Its Response?
The tenth anniversary of the arbitral ruling coincides with the Philippines’ ASEAN chairship in 2026 and ASEAN’s ongoing efforts to conclude an “efficient and substantive” Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea. Will that see any change within the bloc’s method to the award?
The almost certainly state of affairs is that ASEAN will proceed to face a collective dilemma in reaching consensus on any assertion associated to the 2016 award. In spite of everything, this sample has remained unchanged for the previous decade.
The second risk is that the Philippines, as ASEAN chair, could promote stronger language within the Chair’s Assertion or the Joint Communiqué of the 59th AMM, scheduled for July 21, 2026. Whereas a direct reference to the 2016 award would stay politically troublesome, ASEAN may undertake firmer wording, emphasizing the necessity to “absolutely respect authorized processes undertaken in accordance with UNCLOS.” This is able to set a linguistic precedent for future ASEAN statements. Within the quick time period, it might not instantly change China’s habits; nonetheless, it may improve the long-term reputational value of non-compliance with worldwide legislation.
The least seemingly state of affairs is a collective ASEAN assertion formally recognizing or endorsing the 2016 award. ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making course of makes such an final result extremely unbelievable. At the moment, there’s little proof that the strategic calculations of member states are shifting in that path. This example is unlikely to alter until pro-China alignments inside ASEAN weaken, member states cut back financial dependence on China, or Beijing takes actions which can be extensively perceived as crossing a political and diplomatic “crimson line” that compels a unified ASEAN response. But what precisely constitutes such a threshold stays unclear, making the prospect of a collective endorsement of the award distant for the foreseeable future.
What ASEAN’s Continued Silence Means
The tenth anniversary of the 2016 Arbitral Award comes at a very precarious second. China’s coercive actions within the South China Sea haven’t receded however have steadily elevated. ASEAN’s silence sends a disturbing message {that a} main energy can merely ignore a binding ruling issued by a global tribunal established via accepted authorized procedures, with out paying vital political or diplomatic prices. This impression could contribute to the notion that worldwide legislation is just efficient when the pursuits of highly effective states usually are not at stake, which might erode not solely the authority of the award itself but additionally the broader credibility of the rules-based worldwide order.
In the meantime, the 2026 deadline for concluding the COC, collectively endorsed by ASEAN and China in 2023, is approaching, and doubts about its completion proceed to develop. Wu Shicun, chair of the Huayang Heart for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, has argued that the COC is unlikely to be finalized throughout the Philippines’ chairmanship. One main impediment is the persevering with disagreement over the relevance of the 2016 award. Manila is predicted to emphasize its authorized ideas and findings related to the ruling, whereas Beijing is against any try to hyperlink the COC with the method or its conclusions. As ASEAN continues to keep away from mentioning the award to protect inner consensus or appease Beijing, the COC course of could stay incomplete.
The importance of the tenth anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award lies not in its capability to rework the dispute itself, however in its capability to compel all related actors to reassess their positions inside a regional setting that has modified dramatically since 2016. Though the award has not altered China’s habits on the bottom, it has profoundly reshaped the language, argument, and authorized framework of the South China Sea debate.
In the end, ASEAN’s response to this anniversary will replicate a contest of legitimacy between two opposing views: one which “would possibly makes proper,” and the opposite that worldwide legislation, regardless of missing strong enforcement mechanisms, stays one of many few devices obtainable to small and medium-sized states of their interactions with main powers. Whether or not ASEAN ought to formally converse out on the 2016 award stays a matter of debate. Nonetheless, whatever the method chosen, ASEAN should discover the best strategy to outline its personal function and credibility as a champion of a rules-based regional order within the years forward.
