China’s criticism of Japan is intensifying quickly. Throughout the context of China-Japan relations, the present marketing campaign is unprecedented by any historic measure. It has three distinct traits.
First, following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks about Taiwan on November 7, 2025, critics in China doubled down on present points, together with the issue of handled water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear energy plant and the idea of the San Francisco Peace Treaty’s invalidity, increasing them right into a narrative of “new militarism.” Extra lately, the scope of the rhetoric has widened additional, to incorporate the eightieth anniversary of the Worldwide Army Tribunal for the Far East together with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1895. When a Japan Maritime Self-Protection Pressure (JMSDF) vessel transited the Taiwan Strait on April 17, 2026, Chinese language critics had been fast to notice that the date coincided with the anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, suggesting it had been intentionally chosen. From a Japanese authorities perspective, whereas officers might recall the yr of the treaty, this can be very uncommon to recollect the precise date; this specific line of criticism probably got here as a whole shock. Beijing has thus assembled a remarkably numerous arsenal of grievances, starting from the Treaty of Shimonoseki to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and from Fukushima to “new militarism.” The sheer breadth of the marketing campaign is considered one of its defining options.
Second, the criticism has been accompanied by concrete motion. Punitive measures, together with a suspension of seafood imports, restrictions on uncommon earth exports, the appliance of safety provisions, and restrictions on journey to Japan, are progressively increasing. The verbal and the fabric are thus working in tandem. Furthermore, the discourse criticizing Japan is deeply intertwined with China’s broader Western Pacific coverage: the idea of the San Francisco Peace Treaty’s invalidity feeds the argument that Taiwan’s undetermined standing just isn’t acknowledged, and that Okinawa’s standing is equally unresolved. Inside China, the federal government has firmly outlined Taiwan’s standing and expressed robust doubts about any undetermined-status principle derived from the San Francisco Peace Treaty. As for Okinawa, nevertheless, it is just “students” who’re advancing the undetermined-status argument; the federal government has made no express statements on the matter. The rhetoric surrounding Taiwan and Okinawa, and the criticism of Japan, is thus linked to China’s army push past the First Island Chain to the Second Island Chain, and above all to its coverage of unifying Taiwan with the mainland.
Third, there may be the query of coordination with home debates inside Japan. The intent seems to be not solely to reveal to the Chinese language public that voices in Japan sympathize with China’s place, but additionally to resonate with particular segments of Japanese public opinion and drive a wedge inside Japanese society.
One instance is the intensive protection by Chinese language media of the anti-constitutional-amendment rally led by opposition events throughout Japan’s Structure Day in Might 2026, with Chinese language retailers expressing robust sympathy for the demonstrators. A CCTV report on the rally featured Japanese opposition lawmakers. Such protection is being translated into Japanese and circulating on-line in Japan. The standard of Chinese language media’s Japanese-language output is notably excessive, attributable maybe both to the usage of AI or the employment of Japanese employees. Chinese language media protection can be influencing Western retailers; comparable arguments at the moment are showing frequently in English and different languages. A constant sample in such studies is to characterize the Takaichi authorities’s safety coverage revisions, that are responses to China’s rising army capabilities, shifts in U.S. technique, and modifications within the nature of warfare, as “new militarism” — framing a response to new realities as a reversion to previous ones.
The Japanese authorities has not reacted with undue sensitivity to this wave of criticism. It probably calculates that responding to each provocation would solely feed the escalation. It has, nevertheless, mounted some efficient rebuttals. For instance, in November 2025, the Chinese language Embassy in Tokyo posted on social media, invoking the “enemy state clause” within the UN Constitution, stating that if Japan, which it equated to an enemy state, had been to take any motion aimed toward a coverage of aggression once more, the founding members of the United Nations, together with China, would have the proper to take direct army motion with out acquiring permission from the UN Safety Council. In response, Japan’s Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MOFA) posted on social media {that a} decision in regards to the enemy state clause within the UN Constitution had been adopted on the 1995 UN Common Meeting, and that the clause was understood to have already turn out to be out of date. The submit famous that China itself had voted in favor of the decision on the time and criticized China’s assertion as inconsistent with the UN’s judgment.
Such rebuttals stay the exception relatively than the rule, nevertheless. What ought to be refuted, to what extent, and by whom? Japan has but to develop an sufficient framework for answering these questions.
